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What would happen if the United Kingdom (UK) leaves the European Union (EU)? 
The outcome of the referendum on EU membership in the UK on 23 June 2016 will 
not only determine the future of the UK in the EU but also have a considerable 
impact on the rest of Europe. Only rarely have academic and political observers 
zoomed into the details of day-to-day EU policy-making to have a look at what is 
the UK is actually doing at a policy-level. 
By bundling the manifold policy expertise of the researchers of the Institute for 
European Studies (IES) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), this Policy brief series 
takes such a comparative look and investigates the role of the UK in different EU 
policies. All papers in the series ask the following three questions: 
1. What is the state of the EU policy in focus? 
2. What is the UK’s role/interest in this policy field? 
3. What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario at the policy-
level?
In the first paper, Richard Lewis sets the historical and cultural context and explains 
how the UK and the EU have come to such a low-point in their relations. Next, 
five policy fields are analysed: justice and home affairs; free movement policies; EU 
external relations and representation; the (digital) single market; and environmental 
policy. 
The comparative view reveals some interesting insights. First, the UK is a highly 
active player even in policy fields where it seemingly refrained from participating, 
such as justice and home affairs. It has consistently ensured that a certain ‘liberal’ 
spirit and rationale has been pursued in different EU policies, most notably in 
market-related ones. 
Second, the different papers also describe a high degree of uncertainty about what a 
Brexit scenario implies for the UK, but the consensus seems to show more potential 
costs than benefits of withdrawal. For example, it may result in insecurity regarding 
the residence status of the 1.4 million UK citizens living in other EU member states, 
or involve high administrative, legal and political costs in renegotiating all the 
international agreements and treaties thus far signed by the EU. 
Third, the contributions also point out the potential costs to the EU of Brexit. This 
may become evident in the adjusted international weight and influence of the EU 
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in international relations, but also in internal policy developments. Where the UK 
has been a driver of advancing pragmatic and ambitious policies, in environmental 
policy or in the (digital) single market for example, its absence may lead to new 
internal coalitions among member states and a weakening of standards in such 
policy fields. 
Describing the future is full of unknowns. Nevertheless, all the contributions here 
outline more disadvantages than advantages of a Brexit – both for the UK and the 
EU. We hope the work of our researchers provides food for thought in the weeks 
leading up to the UK referendum.
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The United Kingdom’s fraught relationship with the European Union is about to 
enter a new and crucial phase. Prime Minister David Cameron’s commitment to hold 
an ‘in-out’ referendum if he won the election in 2015 based on re-negotiated terms 
of Britain’s membership will become a reality on 23 June 2016.
How have the UK and its partners arrived at this point and, more particularly, what 
might be the consequences of a withdrawal? Even if the referendum results in a 
victory for the pro-membership campaign, there will be consequences that are 
difficult to predict. This paper examines some of the policy issues that will arise in 
either case and attempts to draw a picture of some of the consequences for the EU.
The UK’s Political Ambivalence
Britain’s ambivalent attitude to European integration has a long history, which 
can be traced back to nineteenth century politics and, perhaps more fancifully, to 
the Middle Ages or the Spanish Armada. Britain has always tried to maintain a 
policy of balance of power in Europe such that no one continental country should 
dominate. In the twentieth century, two world wars convinced the British that, as 
Margaret Thatcher put it, their problems arise from continental Europe and that only 
British tenacity and democratic values could resolve the conflicts. Why then become 
involved in complex treaty arrangements requiring the pooling of sovereignty?
Throughout the post-war period leading up to the Treaty of Rome, and since, British 
political parties have vacillated back and forth in their attitudes to the EU. As Denis 
McShane (2015), formerly Tony Blair’s Minister for Europe, put it:
‘Both Conservative and Labour leaderships and their ministers when in government 
have consistently supported NATO, rebutted criticisms of Atlanticism and supported 
nuclear weapons. In contrast, Europe has never engaged much support. The question 
of Europe divides British politics as no other issue. And with governing parties and 
ministers so uncertain, so willing to find fault with Europe, why should voters be any 
different?’ (McShane 2015).
For the left in British politics, Brussels is too business-friendly, and for the right, it 
is hostile to capitalism. Margaret Thatcher was openly antagonistic towards the EU 
in her speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988 and yet it was she who 
signed the Single European Act bringing in qualified majority voting (Young 1998). 
As  Andrew Geddes (2013) writes:
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‘The Conservatives went from being a pro-European integration party, albeit based 
on a pragmatic acceptance of the EC as good for business, to hostility towards 
European integration that was strongly based on the Thatcherite legacy’.
The British do not consider themselves ‘Europeans’. They talk and write about 
‘Europe’ as if it were on another continent. Winston Churchill said as long ago 
as 1930 that ‘we are with Europe, but not of it’ (Saturday Evening Post 1930, as 
quoted in Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953). In his seminal speech in Zurich in 1946, he 
spoke of the United States of Europe, yet he did not mean that the UK should be 
considered part of that enterprise. For the British, or more specifically the English, 
Europe is about interest not identity (McShane 2015:166). This can be illustrated 
in the attitude of Mr Cameron defending the financial interests of the City of 
London. 
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There is no vision of Europe amongst British politicians or the public as there is 
on the continent. These attitudes have been fostered by a vehemently hostile 
press and popular media led by the Australian-American Rupert Murdoch, over 
the 40 years since the UK acceded in 1973. As Reuters correspondent Paul Taylor 
wrote: ‘The aim of the Eurosceptic press is not to present reasoned arguments, 
but rather to demolish it through funny, unlikely stories … they don’t want facts 
to get in the way of a good story’ (McShane 2015:166).
There are three other factors that need to be elucidated in order to explain 
the current situation. The first is the almost sacred doctrine of sovereignty of 
Parliament as set out by Walter Bagehot (1867) in the nineteenth century. It 
matters little that the British have signed numerous bilateral and multi-lateral 
treaties that limit the margin of manoeuvre of Parliament (NATO being a 
prime example).  In addition, devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales has 
made inroads into this doctrine. However, they see the EU as being uniquely 
antagonistic to parliamentary sovereignty as illustrated by the comments about 
‘unelected officials in Brussels’, ignoring, for example, that the entire cabinet of 
the United States is appointed and not elected.
The second is the lingering attachment to the English-speaking world. This is not 
an attachment that is comparable to the Francophone world, which is mainly 
based on language and culture. It is the sentiment that the ‘old’ Commonwealth, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada in particular, plus the United States, 
constitute a unique bastion of Anglo-Saxon values whilst assuring that Britain 
will be able to trade with and influence a geographically wider hegemony than 
exists in Europe. There is some validity in this argument, but these countries have 
moved on since their original criticisms of UK membership and none of them 
would now like to see Britain leave the EU (see BBC Interview with US-President 
Obama 2015).
The third is that whereas the UK was economically behind the other major 
economies of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, since the end of the recession 
that began in 2008, the reverse is the case. Whether this can be ascribed to the 
problems of the euro or the rigidity of continental European economies can be 
endlessly debated. In any event, it is a fact that militates against the arguments 
for remaining in the EU on the basis that Britain does not need the EU to prosper. 
It is not the function of this paper to analyse the economic case for Britain 
to remain in the EU. However, the effects of staying on or leaving the EU are 
significant, if not crucial. The consensus appears to be that Britain’s overwhelming 
economic interest is to remain a member. The Eurosceptics are convinced that 
leaving the EU would allow the UK the freedom to negotiate its own trading 
arrangements with the rest of the world that would be more advantageous and 
lead to wider trading horizons. However, nothing in the treaties prevents the UK 
from developing trade and cooperation with any other country. Indeed, other 
EU countries are doing just that and sometimes more effectively than the UK.
The forthcoming referendum has to be seen against this background. To be sure, 
there are many convinced Europeans in the UK but they will have to combat 
a fierce wall of not only Euroscepticism but also hard-core euro-phobia that 
refuses to acknowledge the achievements of European integration and only 
highlights the setbacks. David Cameron has, therefore, adopted a high-risk 
strategy of staking everything on this one vote. Given the inroads that UKIP 
has made on right-wing voters and the eurosceptic right wing in his own 
Conservative party, he probably had little choice. However, his strategy of re-
negotiation – a term, it should be recalled, that was used by the Labour Wilson 
government in 1975 – could easily work to his disadvantage. The 1975 re-
negotiation was derided by its opponents as window-dressing and this second 
exercise is already suffering the same fate. Even if he succeeds in convincing the 
British public of its merits, the margin of victory risks being thin. The likelihood 
is, therefore, that the Eurosceptics will be calling for another vote at a future 
date and such is the strength of their numbers that they may eventually succeed. 
The EU issue is unlikely to be solved by the referendum, even for a generation.
The Campaign In or Out
David Cameron has repeatedly argued that he will campaign for Britain to remain 
in the EU if he obtains from his negotiating partners ‘a fair deal for Britain’. 
He has declared the re-negotiation a satisfactory outcome for the UK . It is 
difficult to understand what he meant by a ‘fair deal’. The principle of a ‘variable 
geometry’ EU is not in question. The UK already has opt-outs for a number of 
key policy areas – the euro, the Schengen agreement, justice and home affairs. 
Thus, the issue of protecting what might be considered key sovereign areas and 
essential British interests is hardly an issue. UKIP and the Conservative right are 
calling for complete withdrawal and an amicable negotiation under article 50 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Nothing less will satisfy them or was ever likely to do so 
whatever the results of the re-negotiation. 
However article 50, which for the first time in the EU treaties spells out that 
a member state may decide to withdraw from the Union, is untested. There is 
no precedent, so the withdrawal negotiation scenario is uncertain, although it 
is likely to be an accession process in reverse. What article 50 does spell out, 
however, is that the withdrawing state will notify the European Council of its 
intentions and thereafter there will be the conclusion of an agreement by the 
Council, acting on a qualified majority, with the withdrawing state. The treaties 
will cease to apply to the withdrawing state after conclusion of the agreement or, 
failing that, two years after the first notification unless the Council unanimously 
agrees to extend that period. Given the complexity of such negotiations, it is 
not impossible that the UK could be either left in a legal limbo or subject to the 
uncertainties of a unanimous vote in the Council.
David Cameron staked the re-negotiation on a number of key issues
• An exemption for the UK from the principle of an ‘ever closer union’
• An explicit statement that the euro is not the official currency but that the 
EU is a multi-currency union
• A ‘red card’ system giving groups of national parliaments the power to stop 
unwanted legislation and to scrap redundant legislation in force, in other 
words a reduction of red tape
• An emphasis for EU policies to be oriented towards growth, investment 
and jobs
• A mechanism to prevent domination by the Eurozone countries over those 
member states that do not use the euro in protecting and developing the 
single market
• Restrictions for four years of benefits paid to EU immigrants
On 2 February 2016, after intense negotiations at political and officials 
levels, Donald Tusk, President of the Council, published a draft decision for 
consideration by the European Council held on 18-19 February that addresses 
all of these issues. The draft decision underlines that the UK is already entitled 
not to adopt the euro or to participate in the passport-free Schengen area and 
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to choose whether or not to participate in measures regarding justice, freedom 
and security. This emphasises the fact that until now, the UK has had relative 
freedom to go its own way, even on key issues defining the Union.
The conclusions of the European Council published on 19 February (EUCO 1/16)
are striking in their reiteration of the flexibility of treaty provisions that allow 
member states a high degree of leeway in interpreting the principles of the Union 
(mainly free movement of goods, capital and persons and non-discrimination) 
where exceptional circumstances exist. It is true that, in particular, for the 
UK’s claims for safeguards against abuse of social security systems, secondary 
legislation is required that could apply to all member states, not just the UK. 
But the conclusions are largely framed to clarify existing Union practice. This 
illustrates the misleading gloss that British politicians often give to Union legal 
provisions underlining alleged negative aspects. In reality, there are existing 
ways to meet individual member states’ concerns without any of the changes 
agreed on 19 February.
With regard to the euro, the conclusions indicate that, whilst maintaining that 
the euro is central to the achievement of economic and monetary union, no 
member state is obliged to adopt the single currency. Non-participants will not 
create obstacles to the process; in reciprocity, the rights and competences of 
non-participants will be respected. At the same time, the informal meetings of 
ministers of member states that use the euro will not usurp the functions of 
the Council and its legislative powers. This allays UK fears that decisions that 
affect the financial interests of non-participants will be respected even if they 
do not vote. Given Mr Cameron’s Conservative Party’s close links with the City of 
London, this is an important clarification to have achieved.
Regarding the regulatory burden, it is not commonly recognized that the 
European Commission launched a Better Regulation plan as early as 2002. 
The latest iteration of this programme is known as the Regulatory Fitness 
and Performance Programme (REFIT). This process is ongoing. The text of the 
Council conclusions reinforces the European Commission’s commitment to 
competitiveness pledging to strengthen the internal market and take concrete 
steps towards better regulation and lowering the administrative burden. The 
British, however, would have to understand that a single market is not simply a 
customs union; common regulations and standards are required to make it work, 
enforced by the European Court of Justice, and these replace existing national 
regulations. These basic mechanisms of the EU are often poorly understood both 
by the political elite and the public in the UK. 
Concerning the right of oversight of national Parliaments on EU proposals, Mr 
Cameron has won a minimalist concession that if 55% of the votes allocated 
to national Parliaments, through a reasoned opinion, object to a draft EU act, 
then it will be discussed and, if not amended in accordance with the reasoned 
opinion, withdrawn. The Prime Minister’s critics have already stated that this 
safeguard is far from sufficient. Indeed, the reality is that this provision would 
be difficult to invoke. In any case, the likelihood is that a legislative proposal 
from the Commission that met stiff opposition from member states in Council 
working groups or the Committee of Permanent Representatives would never 
reach the full Council and be withdrawn.
Mr Cameron has won substantial changes in the interpretation and application of 
social security legislation. This always was and remains a national competence. 
The Council conclusions reiterate that member states ‘have the right to define 
the fundamental principles of their social security systems and enjoy a broad 
margin of discretion to define and implement their social and employment 
policy, including setting the conditions for access to welfare benefits‘. The new 
provisions concern, in particular, the right to index child benefits according 
the standard of living of the country where the child is living rather than the 
country of residence of the beneficiary worker, the possibility to phase in the 
rights to non-contributory benefits over a period of four years and anti-fraud 
measures such as sanctioning marriages of convenience. There are, furthermore, 
safeguards relating to ‘overriding reasons of public interest’. Although this 
was less than the Prime Minister had requested, it is nevertheless a change of 
substance albeit with a time limit of seven years. It should be understood that 
the enabling legislation will apply to all member states that opt into it, not just 
the UK. It follows that it is possible that British workers in other EU states will 
also receive less in benefits. 
The Council conclusions regarding sovereignty and the interpretation of ‘ever 
closer union’ are very clear. ‘Ever closer union ‘ does not confer the right or a 
legal basis to extend provisions of the treaties or of secondary legislation. Nor 
does it preclude the reduction of EU competences and the return of powers to 
the member states.
However, it is already evident from remarks of British politicians who have 
declared that they will campaign for exit from the EU that this is far from 
adequate. In a sense they are correct. It is fundamental to the functioning of 
the EU that EU law takes precedence over national law unless challenged in a 
judicial process as laid down in the treaties. This is a direct contradiction of the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty as interpreted by Walter Bagehot.
Outcomes post Referendum
If the outcome of the negotiations and the referendum is in favour of Britain 
remaining in the EU, the euphoria will be short lived. The anti-EU camp will not 
disappear and the UK will remain the recalcitrant European. The EU as a whole 
will breathe a sigh of relief because the withdrawal of a major partner with a 
pragmatic view of world affairs and the technicalities of trade would be a major 
and possibly fatal blow to the European project in terms of what can be achieved 
by European integration. 
In addition, there is the fear that other member states whose political elite might 
harbour similar concerns about EU policy areas might be tempted to take the 
same path as the UK. No other member state has taken such a semi-detached 
attitude to the EU as Britain but there have certainly been criticisms along the 
same lines, to say nothing of the rise of nationalist elements in the political life 
of certain member states, even in the staunchest supporters of the Union.
However the issues that trouble the UK will not be solved at a stroke, whatever 
the result. In the first instance, the treaty changes required for some aspects of 
the European Council conclusions are lengthy and drawn out even if the process 
is launched soon after the referendum. Mr Cameron needs to demonstrate 
results to the electorate immediately and this can only be achieved by political 
declarations that will be denounced as not being sufficiently watertight by the 
eurosceptic camp. He has the advantage that the conclusions of the Council 
explicitly say that they are legally binding on the member states but this is not 
easily explained to voters. They have subsequently been deposited at the United 
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Nations as an international treaty. This notion has already been criticised by 
some British politicians. They say that the conclusions can always be challenged 
in a court. This is true of any legal instrument. However, it is very unlikely that a 
court would fail to follow the dicta of the European Council.
If the referendum goes against the UK remaining in the EU, the immediate 
aftermath will be great uncertainty. This will first manifest itself in the probable 
demands of Scotland for a further referendum on independence because it 
is already clear that Scotland would likely vote overwhelmingly to remain in 
the EU. The position of Ireland with its common land border and remaining 
residence and voting privileges vis-à-vis the UK will be in question. Questions 
will then be raised about UK citizens living and working in other EU countries. 
Aside from that, undoing or keeping the links, whether trade-related or in the 
various cooperative programmes, is likely to take several years to sort out during 
which time investment prospects in the UK economy will hardly be improved. 
The arguments for and against a European Economic Area solution for the UK 
have been well rehearsed but would not put Britain in a favourable negotiating 
position either immediately or in the future. Indeed the only possible result from 
that solution would be that, in order to remain in the single market, the UK 
would be bound by EU rules without having a voice in the legislative process, 
whilst still paying into the budget.
There is, of course, no precedent for a member state to withdraw from the EU, nor 
was there any mechanism to do so before the Lisbon Treaty. The immediate effect 
of a negative vote in June 2016 would be to trigger the two year negotiation 
process with the remaining 27 members. The UK can expect few favours from 
this engagement. There have been some hints that it could be used as a further 
negotiation and then a second referendum. This is an unlikely scenario. The Prime 
Minister has already stated that this is a single and not a multiple opportunity 
process. The anti-EU protagonists would denounce it as contrary to the terms 
of a first referendum. Lastly, the European Council conclusions indicate that 
the changes set out in those conclusions would only be implemented when the 
British government has indicated that the UK wishes to remain a member state. 
Thus the whole negotiating process would virtually start from zero.
That said, a decision to leave the EU, whilst sad and likely to be overall negative 
for the UK, will not be the disaster that some pessimists have posited. The UK 
economy is resilient enough and the country’s links, historical and practical, 
strong enough, that in the longer-term, pragmatic solutions will be found. 
The nation is at a crossroads as it was in 1973. The European vocation is not 
acceptable to a large proportion of the population. That is an issue that will not 
vanish and needs to be resolved. 
This is not to deny that there will be consequences that will affect Britain’s 
partners and allies. There will be serious weakening of the EU’s capacity to 
influence world events with the loss of a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council and one of its two military powers. Europe’s links with the United States, 
including the pending free trade agreement (TTIP) will be diluted and the US 
might be tempted to deal more with Germany, as Europe’s strongest economy on 
trade and investment issues.
Paul de Grauwe of the London School of Economics is already on record as 
saying that the withdrawal of the UK might actually be a boost to European 
integration (Le Soir 2016: 21). That is indeed possible. However, the danger of 
British withdrawal is that the major achievements of the EU will start to unravel. 
There are already signs of this relating to the Schengen area in the wake of the 
migration crisis.
This whole process is essentially about British exceptionalism. The United 
Kingdom is at all levels convinced of its profound differences in relation to the 
European continent and that its legal and parliamentary systems are in basic 
contradiction to other European countries. The only way that this can be resolved 
is, according to many in the UK, complete withdrawal and a new relationship 
with the remaining member states. Mr Cameron has now to convince the British 
public that his re-negotiation is sufficient to allay the fears of the doubters. 
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What is the state of EU policy? 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has been a fast-growing field of the European 
integration process. JHA is an umbrella term for a range of distinct policies ranging 
from migration, asylum, border control to civil justice and the fight against terrorism. 
The importance of cooperating in Europe on these issues has rarely been higher than 
at the present day. A series of terrorist attacks, most recently in Paris and Brussels, 
and an unprecedented rise in the number of migrants and refugees seeking to enter 
the territory of the EU have moved JHA issues high up on the agenda of policymakers 
throughout Europe. 
Given the sovereignty-sensitive nature of most JHA issues, EU member states 
have long been reluctant to transfer competences to the EU level. The cooperation 
has developed since the mid-1970s in a range of intergovernmental groups. The 
Maastricht Treaty first added an intergovernmental ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ pillar 
to the EU’s treaty architecture, yet preserved the strict unanimity requirement and 
kept the supranational EU institutions at arm’s length. This changed with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1999) that incorporated the Schengen border-free project into 
the EU’s legal framework and transferred the policy fields of asylum, immigration, 
external border controls and civil law matters to the Community first pillar under 
Title IV. The Treaty of Lisbon ended this institutional development by introducing 
the Community method in the remaining third pillar areas (judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and police cooperation). These treaty changes have significantly 
altered the modes of decision-making in JHA and enhanced the opportunities for 
parliamentarian oversight and judicial scrutiny at EU level.
The EU is not striving to replace, say, a national police-corps with a European one. 
The Lisbon Treaty emphasised that the different legal systems of EU member states 
shall not be merged at EU level: ‘The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, 
security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal 
systems and traditions of the Member States’ (Art. 67, Par. 1 TFEU). A key difference 
is how legalised certain policies are at EU level. The EU does not have the same legal 
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competences for all JHA policies. For issues such as asylum or visa, the EU has 
embarked on developing ‘common policies’, for instance a ‘Common European 
Asylum System’ that harmonises the rules of member states on how to receive an 
asylum seeker and process her or his application. 
In other areas, the EU has less legalised approaches and acts primarily on the basis 
of operational cooperation and the exchange of best practices. A case in point 
has been the integration of migrants into European societies. For a long time, 
member states resisted EU interference in their immigrant integration policies. 
Consequently, an explicit legal basis for developing or coordinating immigrant 
integration policy on the EU level has long been absent (van Puymbroeck, Adam & 
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Goeman 2010: 210). This changed when the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) opened 
up the possibility for legal action to fight racial discrimination (Art. 13, TFEU). A 
decade later, EU institutions were granted the possibility to develop measures to 
support member states in their efforts towards immigrant integration, excluding, 
however, harmonisation of legislation on this issue (Art. 79.4, TFEU). 
The challenges that the EU is currently facing in the JHA field are considerable. 
They include a need for closing security gaps exploited by jihadist fighters. 
A difficult issue has also been the fair distribution of asylum seekers within 
Europe. In 2015 and early 2016, the overwhelming majority of new migrants and 
refugees went to only a few countries such as Germany, Sweden and Greece. 
The EU’s proposed solutions to deal with this situation, including a mandatory 
relocation scheme for asylum seekers in Europe, have remained contested, 
notably in Central and Eastern Europe.
  
What is the UK’s role/interest in Justice and Home 
Affairs?  
At first glance, the UK seems to have little interest in the EU’s cooperation on 
JHA. When the Amsterdam Treaty integrated the Schengen acquis into the 
framework of the EU, the UK – together with Ireland and Denmark – obtained 
an opt-out and refrained from participating in the Schengen passport-free 
project. A special provision, however, allows these states to participate in certain 
Schengen provisions. In the Lisbon Treaty, the UK government, together with 
Ireland, extended the opt-out arrangements to measures relating to police 
cooperation and criminal justice, the newly communitarised policy fields. A new 
provision gives the two states the possibility to withdraw an ‘opt-in’ decision to 
a measure based on the Schengen acquis within three months. In practice, the 
UK has voted in most civil law measures, anti-discrimination directives, many 
measures on curbing irregular migrants, and several early-phase EU asylum laws. 
It has only accepted a few measures on visas, border controls and legal migration 
(Peers 2011: 75).
Has the UK therefore surrendered influence in the EU in order to protect its 
national autonomy in a highly politically sensitive field? In investigating this 
question, Adler-Nissen (2009: 63) comes to the conclusion that this has not been 
the case. In many instances, the UK has actively influenced decision-making 
processes and EU policy outcomes in the JHA field, even when it would not be 
bound by the EU policies. The UK’s efforts have been facilitated by an informal 
norm of consensus-seeking in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. EU ministers 
of interior are usually keen to ‘bring everyone on board’ (Adler-Nissen 2009: 67, 
referring to Lewis 2005), irrespective of the formal voting rules and procedures. 
Different UK governments have considered that the EU level can provide added 
value for fighting organised crime and terrorism. For instance, the UK has 
actively sought to ‘europeanise’ its national model of intelligence-led policing. 
By pushing Europol to base its Organised Crime Threat Assessments (OCTA) on 
the British model, the UK was able to shape Europol’s work and to influence the 
Council’s strategic priorities in the area of fighting organised crime (Carrapico & 
Trauner 2013). This may be interpreted as a notable achievement as intelligence-
led policing ‘was, and probably still is, slightly counter-cultural’ for many EU 
member states (Peter Storr, quoted in House of Lords 2008: Q10). In criminal 
justice and civil law, the UK has been pushing hard for more mutual recognition 
arrangements although the country remained sceptical regarding harmonisation 
(Adler-Nissen 2009: 69).
Migration is another field in which the UK has often sought to influence EU 
policies and/or to provide domestic ideas with more legitimacy through EU 
engagement. In 2003, for instance, the UK tabled a proposal on ‘extraterritorial 
processing’ of asylum claims (Blair 2003). According to the UK idea, the 
processing of asylum claims could take place in both ‘regions of origin’ and in 
‘transit processing centres’ in nearby third countries. The EU would fund such 
facilities. Successful applicants would then be resettled in the UK or another 
EU country, while rejected cases would be returned to their countries of origin 
(The Observer 2003). The UK proposal became an item of different EU summits 
but it finally did not receive the support of enough member states.  However, it 
continues to be discussed up to the present day, notably in the context of the 
current refugee crisis (Leonard & Kaunert 2016). Furthermore, in responding to 
the UK proposal, the Commission developed new policies seeking to enhance 
protection capacities in regions with strong refugee populations such as regional 
protection areas (Trauner 2014).
A similar uploading of the British ‘national model’ to the EU took place in the 
field of immigrant integration (Geddes & Guiraudon 2004). For a long time the 
UK’s integration policy was referred to as a ‘race relations’ model, based around 
its anti-discrimination legislation. This ‘British model’ was highly influential 
for the 2000 EU Anti-Discrimination Directive. This allowed Britain to play the 
European game with minimal need to adapt domestically. Yet, in the meantime, 
Britain’s frontrunner role in anti-discrimination policies has waned, as well as 
its investment in special measures for migrants and refugees. There have been 
55% budget cuts to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and 
the termination of mandatory equality impact assessments (Huddleston et al. 
2015). Over time, funds available for integration activities have reduced ‘to the 
point where now only European Union funds are available’ (Phillimore 2012: 
531). Evidently, if the UK were to leave the EU, there would be no more EU funds 
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available through the European Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (Saggar 
& Somerville 2012:17).
Certainly, at times, the UK’s opt-opt arrangement has prevented them from 
achieving what they sought to achieve. A prominent case has been the UK 
government’s effort to fully participate in setting-up and running the EU’s 
border management agency Frontex. The UK’s ‘opt-in’ was not allowed by the 
other member states based on the argument that the country was not a full 
Schengen member – a decision that even a British appeal before the European 
Court of Justice could not change (Kaunert et al. 2014: 356).
What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario?
‘We secured the absolute right to opt in to any of the asylum and immigration provisions that 
we wanted to in Europe. Unless we opt in, we are not affected by it. And what this actually 
gives us is the best of both worlds. We are not obliged to have any of the European rules 
here but where we decide in a particular area… it allows us to opt in and take part in these 
measures’ (Tony Blair quoted in Geddes 2005: 81, emphasis added) .
The opt-out/opt-in arrangements for the JHA field have provided the UK with 
flexibility. In a sense, the JHA field may be seen as an ideal-type arrangement for 
the UK government in terms of how to set-up its relation with the EU at large – 
participating in joint initiatives, if deemed useful; if not, staying out. According 
to Adler-Nissen (2009: 68-69), ‘legal scholars have wondered just how the UK 
managed to gain such a favourable protocol’. 
The dynamics of cooperation, however, have already changed. The year 2014 
was a crucial one in terms of EU-UK relations in the JHA field. According to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the UK was by then obliged to accept the authority of the Court 
of Justice of the EU over 130 existing agreements in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters (as do the other participating member 
states) – or to make use of a ‘block opt-out’ of all of these measures. UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron decided to exercise this right of a comprehensive 
opt-out. Policy-related considerations seemed to have been only of secondary 
importance for the decision – under pressure from Eurosceptic members of 
the ruling conservative party, the clause provided the UK government with an 
opportunity to underline that it was keen to repatriate powers and sovereignty 
back from Brussels (Brady 2013). The UK government, however, wished to join 35 
measures after the block opt-out. These measures included the European arrest 
warrant, participation in Europol and Eurojust and the Schengen Information 
System (Council of the EU 2014). In December 2014, the other member states 
and the European Commission accepted these British demands. Yet, the UK’s 
cherry-picking in combination with the then announced plan to hold a UK 
referendum on EU membership – ‘have pushed some other Member States’ 
patience to the breaking point’ (Peers 2014). 
It is not certain that the UK will be able to rely on a similar goodwill of the 
other member states if it decides to renegotiate a new relation with the EU 
after a possible no-vote in the referendum on EU membership. As Hugo Brady 
underlines, the political context has already quite changed for the UK, with 
British officials finding it already harder to influence new JHA legislation. ‘The 
2014 opt-out is likely to be remembered as an act of diplomatic self-harm by 
the UK. Britain’s fellow member states are united in disbelief that a large and 
important member state would choose to leave a policy field where it has long 
been an important player’ (Brady 2013: 3).
Overall, it is therefore likely that the UK will not find possibilities to cherry-pick 
its JHA cooperation outside the EU framework in a similarly beneficial way it has 
been able to do so from within the EU. 
Footnotes
1. For the full list see http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15398-2014-INIT/en/pdf
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by Christof Roos
What is the state of the EU policy?
Freedom of movement for persons and workers is a founding EU principle 
safeguarded by EU primary and secondary law (Art. 21, 45 TFEU; Directive 2004/38/
EC). Next to the freedoms defined for capital, goods, and services, person mobility is 
considered to be a core driver for EU integration (Haas 1958: 12). Over six decades, 
since the 1950s, the rights of mobile Europeans have been constantly expanding. 
With the establishment of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), any 
European, economically active or not, was given the right to reside in any other EU 
Member State. The legitimacy of EU freedom of movement rests on the assumption 
that mobility is beneficial for both the single market (Favell and Hansen 2002) and 
for the support of EU citizens for European integration (Favell and Recchi 2009). 
Most importantly, though, is the fact that the actual mobility of EU citizens signifies 
changes to state sovereignty; the EU policy limits the state’s control over the people 
that are residing on the territory.
Claims for changes to EU person and worker mobility question core Treaty 
provisions, such as the right to freedom and residence in the EU (Art. 21 TFEU) and 
the fundamental principle of non-discrimination (Art. 45 TFEU). As these freedoms 
and rights are linked to EU integration, any revisions need to be based on unanimity 
among member states. Therefore, serious restrictions to EU migration are unlikely 
to find consensus among member states. Changes to secondary EU law, such as the 
citizenship directive or social security coordination call for a qualified majority, and 
are more likely to be achieved among member states. I discuss here how British 
demands for re-assessing social rights of EU citizens could actually be met by 
changes to secondary EU law. However, a crucial change to the principle of freedom 
of movement, by re-imposing control on EU citizens entry and residence in other 
member states, would be hard to achieve, even outside EU Treaty obligations.
What is the UK’s role/interest in Freedom of Movement? 
At first glance, the UK’s call for restrictions on freedom of movement is puzzling. The 
British labour government of the 2000s embraced one of the most liberal positions 
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towards the mobility rights of citizens from the new Eastern European member 
states. Together with Sweden and Ireland, the British government decided to open 
its labour market for worker and person mobility from these countries. In contrast, 
ten years later, the conservative UK Prime Minister David Cameron considers the 
liberal policy towards accession countries a mistake (Gostynska-Jakubowska 
2015: 12). The other then EU-15 member states made use of transitional 
arrangements allowing for restrictions of worker mobility for up to seven years 
(Kraleva 2013). As a consequence of openness, net-migration from the EU to the 
UK quadrupled in 2004 (15,000 to 87,000). Between 2004 and 2010, more than 
600,000 EU citizens had moved to the UK (ONS 2014). In addition to the liberal 
policy towards EU accession countries the financial crisis that severely hit many 
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southern European member states incentivised migration to the UK. During the 
crisis years (2008-2012), EU migration to the UK slowed down but was still 
significantly positive, with 362,000 net arrivals (ONS 2014).
However, with 2.2 million EU migrants, the UK is not the EU Member State in 
which most EU migrants reside. Germany (3.7 million), Spain (2.3 million), and 
France (2.4 million) have a larger share in EU mobility. At the same time, Britain 
also sends 1.4 million of its citizens to other EU countries. Spain, Ireland, France 
and Germany are popular destinations for British citizens in Europe (Vargas-Silva 
2012: 4-5). The data show that the UK not only previously held liberal positions 
towards immigration from Eastern Europe but it is also a major sending and 
receiving country of intra-EU mobility. Against this backdrop we must question 
why EU freedom of movement is one major justification for the UK to leave the 
EU.
The policy debate on an ‘migration control crisis’ began parallel to the financial 
crisis and the change in government from Labour to Tory in 2010. Since then, free 
movement of EU citizens to the UK has become one of the most politicised issues 
in the UK. The actors critical of EU freedom of movement include populist and 
conservative parties such as the Tories and the UK Independence Party and the 
media (Bruzelius et al. 2014). The issue that raised most concern in the British 
public and political debate was the assumption of ‘welfare tourism’ – i.e. EU 
citizens moving to the UK because of easy access to non-contributory benefits. 
The claim was hardly supported by empirical evidence. In fact, EU migrants 
contributed positively to public finances and their employment rate was higher 
than that of British nationals (Dustmann & Frattini 2013). Despite a lack of 
evidence, the connection between EU migrants and ‘welfare tourism’ epitomised 
a widely shared unease about immigration in the UK. Actual problems could be 
observed with regard to rising prices in the housing market and immigration to 
semi-urban and rural areas that were not used to or equipped for accommodating 
larger numbers of newcomers (Vargas-Silva 2014: 126). Most important to the 
debate in the UK was the fact that EU migration, although for decades smaller in 
size than immigration from third countries, could not be restricted. The inability 
to restrict EU admission resulted in a debate discussing a ‘migration control 
crisis’ in relation to the country’s EU membership (Paul 2016). 
In the run-up to the British referendum on a possible Brexit, UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron proposed a list of reforms to the European Council. A settlement 
on these demands was a pre-requisite that he would campaign to keep the UK in 
the EU. Among other issues of British concern with the EU, immigration featured 
prominently on the list of demands for re-negotiation. Calls for restrictions focus 
on issues of abuse of EU rights and welfare state access of EU citizens in the UK. 
Cameron assumes that high levels of immigration in the UK are connected to the 
‘draw that [the British] welfare system can exert across Europe’ (UK Government 
2015). In order to discourage ‘migration for welfare’, he claimed a four-year 
qualification period before EU migrants can claim in-work benefits such as 
income top-ups and housing benefits. In addition, out of work benefits such as 
child allowance should not be paid to children living abroad. 
After months of British diplomacy with EU member states and EU institutions in 
2015, the Commission and Council signalled room for policy change (European 
Council 2016a). In a two-day marathon meeting on 18 and 19 February 2016, the 
European Council agreed that child benefits could be indexed to the conditions 
of the Member State where the child resides (European Council 2016b: 22, see 
also Policy brief 2016/5). The proposed changes to social security coordination 
rules (Regulation 883/2004) became possible because Denmark, Germany, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands were also critical of having to pay child benefit 
allowances to children living abroad. However, withholding in-work benefits 
from EU workers in Britain directly infringes EU non-discrimination principles. 
Thus, the Council suggested a ‘safeguard mechanism to respond to exceptional 
situations of inflow of workers from other Member States’ (European Council 
2016a). That way, the general commitment towards freedom of movement and 
non-discrimination remained untouched and restrictions were justified on the 
basis of emergency. The Council Presidency and the Commission acknowledged 
an exceptionally high inflow of workers into the UK in recent years. The so-called 
‘emergency brake’ allows for denial of benefits to newly arrived workers for four 
years within a seven year time period. The safeguard mechanism functions as an 
amendment to Regulation 492/2011 and only denies benefits to newly arriving 
EU workers (European Council 2016b: 34). Apparently, some Eastern European 
member states had given up their principled opposition to a qualification period 
for full access to the welfare state (Taylor et al. 2016). Immediately after the 
European Council agreed on the ‘new settlement for the United Kingdom within 
the European Union’, Cameron kept his promise and announced to campaign for 
Britain to remain in the EU. 
However, this EU-UK settlement will be difficult to defend factually and 
politically. Concerning the facts, a waiting period for in-work benefits will 
probably not decrease the numbers of EU migrants in the UK. Cameron’s 
emphasis on benefits in the re-negotiation is somehow puzzling since his 
government already adopted some restrictions targeting the access of EU 
migrants to benefits. The UK’s open and growing economy attracts EU migrants 
rather than its in-work welfare benefits or child allowance. The networks 
established between Europeans in the UK and those still in the home countries 
are strong and perpetuate movements. Push factors for moving to the UK remain 
as long as economic and labour market conditions in southern and eastern 
Europe are grim (Galgósci et al. 2012: 10-12). Therefore, it is fair to assume 
Policy   brief • n° 2016/7
                 Policy   brief • n° 2016/7
that a decrease in the numbers of EU migrants can only be achieved outside 
of EU freedom of movement policy. Politically, the suggested settlement was 
hardly considered as a ‘better deal’ by Eurosceptics in Cameron’s own party. 
Influential conservative politicians such as Chris Grayling, Leader of the House 
of Commons, and Ian Duncan Smith, work and pensions secretary, and others 
were quick in denying the success of Cameron’s re-negotiation efforts (Watt & 
Traynor 2016). Eurosceptics among Tories or elsewhere will not be convinced by 
any re-negotiation that does not lead to a Brexit. Decisive for the success of the 
‘Britain stronger in Europe campaign’ (‘Bremain’) is the media and its influence 
on the general public’s attitude. Major newspapers, including The Guardian, The 
Times, the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, received the ‘settlement’ with mixed 
reviews. A critical public, unconvinced by the settlement, can well shift the 
balance towards Britain leaving the UK.
What are potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario? 
The likelihood of a Brexit motivates hypotheses on what might happen to free 
movement and movers in the UK and the rest of the EU. Answers to the following 
questions were sought: 
1. What are the alternatives to free movement allowing the UK control over 
EU migration?
2. What happens to the status of EU citizens in the UK? 
3. What happens to the status of UK citizens in the EU?
4. What could be the unintended consequences of re-introducing immigration 
control for EU citizens in the UK? 
A possible alternative to full UK membership in the EU is becoming part of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), joined by Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland. The caveat is that EU-EFTA relations defined in the 
agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) include an obligation for the 
free movement of workers (Art. 28 EEA). Switzerland, an EFTA country, is not a 
signatory to the EEA but has signed a separate bilateral agreement on freedom 
of movement with the EU (OJ L114/6). The Swiss government’s attempt to 
introduce quota regulations for EU citizens moving to the country proved to be 
a great challenge in changing the agreement. As a consequence of a nationalist 
backlash and referendum in 2014, Switzerland aims at decreasing immigration, 
including labour migration from European neighbours. 
In early 2016, negotiations with the EU Commission were deadlocked. Swiss 
politicians indicated that no settlement on the issue of free movement would 
make the suspension of all bilateral agreements with the EU a likely option 
(Euractiv 2015). The struggle over terminating free worker mobility between the 
EU and Switzerland once again shows how indivisible freedom of movement 
is from the internal market and other economic freedoms. The Swiss case 
exemplifies that withdrawing from free movement questions further agreements 
on free trade. Therefore, after a Brexit, the re-introduction of national quotas 
or other control measures establishing a ‘free movement light’ does not seem 
to be an acceptable option for the EU. Since the UK highly values access to the 
internal market, it might be possible that it prioritises economic freedom over 
immigration control. The UK could join EFTA, and freedom of movement could 
be referred to as an issue that remains ‘unresolved’. This seems to be a likely 
scenario in the light of the consequences that EU as well as British nationals 
face: they would become third-country nationals for the purpose of entry and 
residence.
The re-introduction of immigration control would have serious consequences for 
the status of 2.2 million EU citizens as well as 1.4 million UK citizens exercising 
their free movement rights. If immigration controls were enforced retroactively 
and not only on new arrivals, insecurity with regard to residency in a member 
state would probably lead to an increase in citizenship requests. Scholars 
observed this development during the economic crisis. Compared to pre-crisis 
data, it was more likely that EU migrants from crisis-struck southern European 
countries would acquire citizenship of their northern European country of 
residence (Graeber 2016). EU migrants in precarious employment situations, 
unsure about the availability of employment visas, would likely opt for this 
alternative.
For the 400,000 British pensioners that reside in the south of Europe, in France, 
Spain or other member states, Brexit would put serious constraints on their free 
or state-subsidised access to health care (The Economist 2014). Within the equal 
treatment provisions of the treaty and the citizenship directive (2004/38/EU), 
British retirees enjoy the same rights as other national pensioners. Withdrawing 
these rights would probably jeopardise the budgets of many retirees living 
abroad. Return migration to Britain could be an effect, putting additional 
pressure on an already tense housing market. In the current economic situation, 
a low-level resale in Spain would leave many of the British retirees dependent 
on social housing in UK.
UK workers in the EU would have the option to acquire a residence status 
within EU immigration legislation. Long-term resident status would be a viable 
option for those already living in a EU country for more than five years. British 
citizens, however, may have to pass integration and language tests to qualify 
for the status (see also Policy brief 2015/6). British workers looking for first 
admission may use the EU Blue Card system, aimed at attracting highly-skilled 
third country nationals. The respective earnings threshold that can be applied 
 Policy briefs are published by the
Institute for European Studies
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence




T +32 2 614 80 01
ies@vub.ac.be
by member states could make it difficult to attain the status. Next to national 
schemes for labour migration, EU legislation on seasonal employment as well as 
intra-corporate transferees offers short-term access to the EU labour market. 
Ordinary workers already working in a EU country can rely on the rights defined 
in the single permit safeguarding access to social rights (Roos 2015). Additional 
options for entry are the students’ and researcher directive. However, EU and 
national law regulating immigration of third country nationals are less generous 
in terms of rights and entry requirements than provisions regulating EU freedom 
of movement (Peers 2014). 
The reciprocal re-introduction of immigration control could lead to unintended 
consequences. Visa overstaying or irregular immigration of EU citizens to the UK 
and vice versa might well be the result of quotas and visas. As a consequence, 
deportation of EU or UK citizens would become more likely. Aside from the 
burden created for the EU or UK migrants, the administrative and legal costs 
would be extraordinary. New documents would have to be issued, procedures 
changed and public authority would have to deal with the legal appeals of tens 
if not hundreds of thousands of people.
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What is the state of EU policy in external representation?
Discussions about British influence in the world form a substantial backdrop to the 
Brexit debate, and will doubtless emerge as one of the central points of contention 
in the ongoing referendum campaign in the UK. Optimists on either side will 
enthusiastically promote the power that Britain wields in the international context. 
Leaving the EU will finally give the UK unfettered freedom to pursue its interests on 
an international scene, and allow it to forge agreements with any country it likes. 
Alternatively, remaining a member of the 28-nation bloc will ensure that Britain’s 
interests are protected by a group of like-minded countries. Pessimists on both sides 
of the debate will either portray a Britain doomed to isolation, or to the shackles of 
a political union that is fraught with economic, social and political problems. Both 
sides will logically declare that British interests are best served in or out of the EU. 
Whatever the result will be on 23 June, the debate itself will have ramifications for 
the role of the UK in the EU, particularly in the way the rest of the world views the 
EU’s capacity to work on the international scene.
What is the scope of EU external representation and how is this executed in today’s 
EU? This paper limits discussion to the EU as a diplomatic actor, only one element 
of the EU’s foreign policy.1 Diplomacy, once considered the playground of heads of 
states alone, is in transition. Representation on the global landscape is characterised 
not only by statehood; the EU’s external representation has evolved to recognise 
this. Multilateralism, multipolarity, and the growth of transnational non-state actors 
are changing the patchwork of international politics. It is also changing the way 
actors represent themselves. In this ‘post-Westphalian’ diplomatic environment, the 
EU seems well suited to participating in these developments, acting alongside the 
EU’s member states. It is itself a product of these post-national times (Cooper 2004; 
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Edwards 2014).
Different European actors represent the EU at different times. The relatively young 
post of the European Union High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR/VP) is the most prominent of these actors. In terms of external 
representation, the HR/VP should ‘conduct political dialogue with third parties 
The UK in EU External Representation: a 
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on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international 
organisations and at international conferences’ (Art 27.2 TEU). The current High 
Representative is supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The High Representative’s role was originally established as part of the Council 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam, and evolved into its current shape in the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EEAS formally started work in January 2011 (Missiroli 2010; Piris 
2009), bringing together officials from the Council and the Commission alongside 
national diplomats seconded from their ministries.2
It is fair to say that the EEAS is an organisation defined by compromise (Blockmans 
2012; Vanhoonacker and Reslow 2010). Ambitions and expectations for the EEAS 
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have been driven by conflicting forces: functionalist aspirations for efficiency, 
coherence and coordination across EU policy fields led to a strong desire for an 
institution that could globally represent the EU. The EU’s external representation 
was widely criticised due to its rather complex mechanisms (with the European 
Commission, rotating Presidency and member states all taking up the role 
of external representation at one point or another). More intergovernmental 
aspirations drove the founders of the EEAS to develop an organisation that 
simply streamlined the coordination of the EU institutions and supported 
member states, and additionally to reduce the burden on national diplomatic 
services in this period of austerity. In other words: everyone involved could see 
a problem (coherence, duplication, inefficiency,…), and everyone involved had 
their own solution (e.g. the European Parliament: see Fiott (2015b) and Brok and 
Gualtieri (2013)).
The extensive networks of coordination that exist between national governments, 
national diplomatic services and EU institutions also extend beyond the EEAS. 
In areas where the EU has mixed or exclusive competence, the European 
Commission also participates in EU external representation (environment and 
trade are two examples). In all instances where an EU body represents the EU, 
coordination between national- and EU-level actors is enacted. The EU is often 
bound to negotiating mandates from the member states, either through the 
Council of the EU or the European Council (Furness 2013). The EU thus cannot 
represent its member states without their support, even if this automony is 
contested.3
EU external representation also serves to coordinate positions internally as well 
as to the world. This ‘side-effect’ of the EU’s diplomatic role in the world means 
that 28 states can already negotiate on policy issues prior to participating in 
wider international negotiations. The obvious advantage of a combined EU 
external representation is therefore complemented by the benefits of already 
having a large bloc of countries in agreement on international policy. Highly 
appropriately, and in the cases where EU member states do agree on a policy 
direction, l’union fait la force.
What is the UK’s role and interest in EU external 
representation?
The British have consistently maintained that the birth of a European ‘foreign 
ministry’ should not imply further ‘competence creep’ in the EU’s external role. The 
Treaty of Lisbon helped to create a patchwork that does not overcome the legacy 
of past endeavours, or indeed succeed in building up a ‘single’ supranational EU 
representation in the world. It tries to accommodate smaller state wishes for 
a combined presence in diplomatic space, along with the insistence of larger 
states (notably the UK) that it maintain a low-key role. The EEAS, according to 
the Treaty on European Union (Art 27.3 TEU), is to work ‘in cooperation with the 
diplomatic services of the Member States’ and not instead of them. It ensures, 
that ‘unnecessary duplication of tasks, functions and resources with other 
structures should be avoided’ (Council of the European Union 2010). The British 
Government must have been pleased to see the Council Decision; they wished 
to ensure that their ambitions as a global power would not be undermined by 
an EU acting as an autonomous actor. Yet there are differing interpretations and 
implementations of the EU’s external role across policy areas: the patchwork is 
still being quilted, yet the seamstresses are member states and EU institutions 
alike (Missiroli 2010).
Despite the UK’s apparent unwillingness to ‘undermine’ their own role in 
international affairs, they have been pushing for a heavy British presence in the 
EEAS. In recognition of the importance of the UK’s support for the EU’s external 
‘face’, a British person was given the task of sewing the patchwork together to 
create the first operational EEAS. Baroness Catherine Ashton was the incumbent 
British representative in the European Commission and became the first person 
to fill the combined post of HR/VP.
Pragmatism has dominated the EU’s foray into external relations, and member 
states have maintained an important role in external representation – as 
‘lead negotiators’ in environmental policies, for example (Delreux & Van den 
Brande 2012). EU external representation has remained as the sum of its parts. 
Effectively, each member state has the right to represent itself in international 
negotiations whilst also participating in coordination with other EU member 
states. The British Government famously blocked over 70 EU statements to UN 
Committees in 2011, citing that the statements should have been made ‘on 
behalf of the EU and its Member States’ and not just ‘on behalf of the EU’. 
Current arrangements concerning external representation (based upon UK 
insistence) rarely allow the EU to speak when member states do not agree, and 
certainly do not allow the HR/VP to represent member states if no accord has 
been made (Kaddous 2015; Piris 2009).4
One of the standard criticisms of EU external representation is that it has been 
multitudinous and incoherent. The House of Lords European Union Committee 
stated in 2013 that coherence improved with the establishment of the HR/VP 
post (European Union Committee 2013: 54). Whilst a substantial number of 
observers have lamented the lack of a single European voice in international 
affairs, the focus appears to have shifted to an appreciation of a coherent, 
consistent, and not necessarily single, voice. Such a process has indeed suited 
the British diplomatic temperament. The UK is a key supporter of maintaining 
the capacity to act independently on the international stage, and yet has equally 
clearly been a beneficiary of ensuring that the EU as a whole acts towards 
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supporting their viewpoints (see Fiott 2015a). British interests can often be far 
more effectively promoted should there already be 27 other countries supporting 
them. The backing of the EU in discussions at a global level can be of immense 
support. The informal and formal coordination mechanisms that the EU provides 
are valuable assets in the British diplomatic armoury; this has been recognised 
by the present and previous UK Governments.
Since the establishment of the EEAS, the UK Government (dominated by the 
Conservative Party) has been driven by an antagonistic approach to Europe, 
and this has been reflected in its attitude towards the EU’s role in external 
representation. As a member of the ancien regime, a founding member of many 
international organisations, and a current member of many of the different 
international fora in its own right (UNSC, G8, etc.), the UK has long pushed 
for an EU machinery that supports its member states in representing European 
and national interests internationally. This is clearly a prerogative that the 
British Government would like to maintain. In essence, discussions over external 
representation revolve around the presentation of representation, and not 
necessarily the practice of representation.
What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario?
As described in the introduction, both optimistic and pessimistic opinions can be 
found on either side of the debate on a Brexit.
Optimists in the leave campaign may envisage that the UK relationship with the 
EU itself will witness little change with respect to external representation. The 
UK will always be free to align itself to an ‘EU approach’ in any case. In a positive 
light, one could argue that the years of working together both domestically 
and internationally would create a mutual understanding that does not need 
formal institutional ties to ensure continuity. One could assume that the years 
of institutional interactions, officials would have been ‘socialised’ into speaking 
the same language, even if they would not share the same discourse (Juncos & 
Pomorska 2014).
The rosy pictures drawn by Brexit enthusiasts, of a UK that would be finally 
free to represent itself in an international context, grossly underestimates the 
EU’s role in representing European and national interests in international fora. It 
also ignores the global leverage that comes from having 28 like-minded states 
working together in international fora. It neglects to consider the impact of 
isolation from the multiple layers of coordination and interaction that take place 
in Brussels, Geneva, and New York. Leaving the EU would block the UK’s ability 
to participate in formulating common positions for all EU members, thereby 
reducing its ‘domestic’ and ‘external’ capacity.
The potential implications of a Brexit should be relatively clear. They are three-
fold: 1) the removal of the possibility for the UK to pool resources with other 
European colleagues in international fora, 2) an inability to help shape the 
position of other EU members and 3) a weakened international presence (and 
consequent inability to ‘punch above its weight’).
If the best an optimist can hope for is an argument based on ‘not much will 
change’, a pessimist is able to present far more dramatic potentials. As a key 
trading partner to the EU, the UK will still need to align itself with EU on issues 
where trade is involved (goods, services, environmental standards, etc.). Yet it 
will have no influence on the coordination of EU positions in these international 
negotiations. The UK might be unfettered by coordination responsibilities, but it 
would also lose the ability to influence the EU’s position. It will need to negotiate 
with EU representatives in plenaries and in corridors, and not inside the EU’s 
official coordination meetings.
Arguments for Brexit that focus on inefficiency in external representation do 
not take effectiveness into account: when Europeans agree, they are stronger 
together. The current structure of EU external representation might be inefficient 
(see Blockmans et al. 2013), but the ‘cumbersome internal coordination process 
between Member States and EU institutions’ (Wouters, Chané & Odermatt 2015: 
179) often facilitates effective outcomes for the EU’s member states when their 
interests are aligned. The British presence on the international scene would 
undoubtedly be weakened if it did not have the ability to pool resources with 
their neighbours.
The UK would undoubtedly (gradually) lose its influential role in the world were 
it to leave the EU. It may have a Permanent Seat at the UN’s Security Council, 
and it may have a Commonwealth that it can work with, but both of these will 
require heavy investments from the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 
a time when budgets are under pressure (see Carta and Whitman 2013 for more 
on the EEAS/FCO relationship). This short paper has not even dared to address 
the legal and political costs that will be brought to bear as the UK extricates 
itself from international treaties and agreements signed by the EU, and then 
negotiates to re-enter these same arrangements. The United States Government 
has already publicly expressed its desire for the UK to remain part of the EU; 
they do not consider conducting independent and parallel diplomatic activities 
with the UK and its European partners as ideal. The UK may be able to draw on 
its ties with the Commonwealth to reinforce its position on the world stage, but 
this cannot replace the intertwined relationship that has been developing over 
the past sixty years with other European countries.
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An EU of 27 European states would still be an important and powerful diplomatic 
actor in the world. Despite the UK not being the only such power in the EU 
(France is also a jealous guardian of its historical role in international relations), 
it is conceivable that the remaining member states may desire to further the EU’s 
coherence, efficiency and effectiveness in years to come. If the EU did make such 
a move towards closer political representation beyond its borders, it would be 
difficult to see how the UK could continue to position itself as an independent 
global power, playing in the same league as the other G20 countries. Such a 
situation may lead to an ‘independent’ UK losing its ability to ‘punch above its 
weight’ in the world.
EU external representation is still in its infancy, and a UK departure at this 
moment may give thrall to those wishing to reshape the EU’s diplomatic role 
into something counter to British interests (a stronger EU may emerge, one 
that overwhelmingly counts for ‘more’ than the UK in terms of international 
presence). The current UK Government has consistently argued that the EEAS 
and the HR/VP should play a supporting role for member states. The present 
setup works very much in the UK Government’s favour. It does allow for everyone 
to have the best of both worlds.
Endnotes
1. This paper also will not cover the topic of delegations, which has been covered in more 
detail in Whitman (2010), Drieskens and Schaik (2010).
2. As of 2012, 19% of staff come from member states’ diplomatic services and 
approximately 200 British officials work in the EEAS (see House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Report, January 2012. Available from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xlix/42803.htm).
3. For a pre-Lisbon example of how this coordination works at the United Nations, see 
Degrand-Guillaud (2009). Post-Lisbon analysis is provided by Blavoukos et al. (2016). In 
environmental policies, see Delreux and Van den Brande (2012), and for trade (pre-Lisbon) 
see Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999).
4. See also correspondence between the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
Council of the European Union, and the UK Parliament’s European Scrutiny Committee, 
which noted: “[t]he EU can only make a statement in those cases where it is competent 
and there is a position which has been agreed in accordance with the relevant Treaty 
provisions”; “[e]xternal representation and internal coordination does not affect the 
distribution of competences under the Treaties nor can it be invoked to claim new 
forms of competences”. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/
cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xlix/42821.htm, and http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015901%202011%20INIT, both last accessed 24 March 2016.
References
Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., Galariotis, I. & Gianniou, M., 2016. The European Union’s visibility and 
coherence at the United Nations General Assembly. Global Affairs, March, pp 1–11. doi:10.1080/233
40460.2016.1132650.
Blockmans, S., 2012. The European External Action Service one year on: First signs of strengths and 
weaknesses. 2012/2. The Hague: Centre for the Law of EU External Relations. http://www.asser.nl/
upload/documents/1272012_11147cleer2012-2web.pdf.
Blockmans, S., Cremona, M., Curtin, D., De Baere, G., Duke Simon, D., Eckes, C., Hillion, C., Van Vooren, 
B., Wessel, R. & Wouters, J., 2013. EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Edited by 
Blockmans, S. and Hillion, C,. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. http://ceps.eu/book/eeas-
20-legal-commentary-council-decision-2010427eu-establishing-organisation-and-functioning-e.
Brok, E. & Gualtieri, R., 2013. DRAFT REPORT with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation 
to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President 
of the European Commission, to the Council and to the Commission on the 2013 review of the 
organisation and the functioning of the EEAS (2012/2253(INI)), March. European Parliament, pp 1–9.
Carta, C. & Whitman, R., 2013. The United Kingdom and the European External Action Service. In Balfour, 
R. & Raik, K., eds. The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies. Brussels: EPC Issue 
Paper, pp 137–48.
Cooper, R., 2004. The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. 2nd ed. Atlantic 
Books. http://www.worldcat.org/title/breaking-of-nations-order-and-chaos-in-the-twenty-first-
century/oclc/56569283.
Council of the European Union, 2010. Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU). Europa.eu, July. Council Decision 
2010/427/EU. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf.
Degrand-Guillaud, A., 2009. Characteristics of and Recommendations for EU Coordination at the 
UN. European Foreign Affairs Review 14 (4). Kluwer Law International, pp 607–22. http://www.
kluwerlawonline.com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2048/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2009041.
Delreux, T. & Van den Brande, K., 2012. Taking the lead: informal division of labour in the EU’s external 
environmental policy-making. Journal of European Public Policy 20 (1). Routledge: pp 113–31. doi:10
.1080/13501763.2012.693421.
Drieskens, E. & van Schaik, L., 2010. The European External Action Service: Preparing for Success. The 
Hague: Clingendael. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20101200_cling_artikel_drieskens_
en_schaik.pdf.
Edwards, G., 2014. The Public Face of a Proto-Something ….: Diplomacy and the European Union. 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 25 (1): 115–34. doi:10.1080/09592296.2014.873614.
European Union Committee, House of Lords, 2013. The EU’s External Action Service: Report. HL Paper 147. 
London: European Union Committee, House of Lords; The Stationery Office. http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/147/147.pdf.
Fiott, D., 2015a. Our Man in Brussels. The UK and the EEAS: Ambivalence and Influence. In Balfour, R., 
Carta, C. & Raik, K., eds. The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries : 
Convergence or Divergence? Farnham, Surrey, England: Routledge, pp 75-88.
Fiott, D., 2015b. The diplomatic role of the European Parliaments parliamentary groups. Sieps European 
Policy Analysis, no. 3 (March), pp 1–12.
Furness, M., 2013. Who Controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU External 
Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review 18 (1). Kluwer Law International, pp 103–25. http://www.
kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2013006.
Juncos, A. E & Pomorska, K., 2014. Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European External 
Action Service. Journal of Common Market Studies 52 (2), pp 302–19. doi:10.1111/jcms.12107.
Kaddous, C., ed., 2015. The European Union in international organisations and global governance: recent 
developments. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Meunier, S., and Nicolaïdis, K., 1999. Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (3). Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pp 477–501. doi:10.1111/1468-
5965.00174.
Missiroli, A., 2010. The New EU ’Foreign Policy’ System after Lisbon: A Work in Progress. European Foreign 
Affairs Review 15 (4). Kluwer Law International, pp 427–52. http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/
abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2010033.
Piris, J.C., 2009. The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511762529.
Rosenau, J. N. & Czempiel E. O., eds., 1992. Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. http://www.worldcat.org/title/governance-
without-government-order-and-change-in-world-politics/oclc/24010693.
Vanhoonacker, S. & Reslow, N., 2010. The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by 
Understanding Backwards. European Foreign Affairs Review 15 (1). Kluwer Law International, pp 
1–18. http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2010001.
Whitman, R. G., 2010. Strengthening the EU’s external representation. EXPO/B/AFET/FWC/2009-01/
Lot6/02. Brussels: European Parliament. http://www.tepsa.eu/download/studies_for_the_european_
parliament/briefings-on-security-defence/Whitman%20Strengthening%20the%20EUs%20
external%20representation.pdf.
Wouters, J., Chané, A. L. & Odermatt, J., 2015. The European Union: a shadowy global actor? The UN 
system as an example. In Fahey, E., ed. The Actors of Postnational Rule-Making: Contemporary 
Challenges of European and International Law. Routledge, pp 163/84.
Policy   brief • n° 2016/8
About the author
Jamal Shahin is a member of the European Economic 
Governance Cluster of the Institute for European Studies 
and Assistant Professor of European Studies at the 
University of Amsterdam.
æPolicy  brief
by Harri Kalimo, Trisha Meyer, Jamal Shahin, Fausta Todhe 
Introduction 
The European Single Market has been the main thrust of the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in the European Union. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was 
created in 1960, driven by a British desire to offer European countries the economic 
benefits of a larger internal market in a situation where the full accession of EFTA 
countries to the European Economic Community was, for various reasons, not 
possible (Milward 2005: 3). For the UK, membership in the (now) EU in 1973 thus 
represented a deliberate choice to participate in the European integration project 
beyond its economic core. 
Key events in EU-UK relations with a focus on the Single Market 
(based on Dinan 2014; Hartley 2014)
1960 Austria, Denmark, Finland (1961), Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Swit-
zerland and the United Kingdom establish the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA).
1961 The UK’s application to the European Economic Community (EEC) is 
denied.
1973 The UK joins the EEC along with Ireland and Denmark.
1975 In a UK referendum, 67.2% of British citizens agree to stay in the EEC.
1993 After many internal conflicts the UK ratifies the Maastricht Treaty 
(TEU). Nevertheless the UK does not agree to the common currency 
and the ‘Social Chapter’. 
 1995 The UK refuses to sign the Schengen Agreement.




Most EU member states adopt the Euro, but the UK keeps its own 
currency.
In 2016, both the EU’s internal market and all the other forms of European 
integration have, however, evolved far from the state of play in 1973. The crucial 
question, therefore, is whether the EU’s Single Market has developed in a fashion 
that, in the aggregate, remains beneficial to the UK, and if it has, whether such 
benefits outweigh the potential net costs that the membership may entail in view 
of the (partly considerable) changes in other respects. In this paper we focus on the 
The United Kingdom and the (Digital) 
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former question: the implications of the British participation in the EU Single 
Market for the UK and for the EU. Building on this reflection, we also briefly 
discuss possible consequences of a ‘Brexit’ scenario. Considering the diverse and 
vast nature of Single Market policies, the paper primarily draws on examples 
from the Digital Single Market. We conclude that from a (Digital) Single Market 
perspective, a ‘Brexit’ would entail losses for both the UK and the EU, primarily in 
terms of liberal regulatory influence and continued access to goods and services.
By bundling the manifold policy expertise of the 
researchers of the Institute for European Studies 
(IES), this paper forms part of a series of analyses 
investigating the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ 
scenario for different EU policies. All papers ask 
the same three questions: 1) What is the state 
of the EU policy in focus?  2) What is the UK’s 
role/interest in this policy field? 3) What are the 
potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario at the 
policy-level? 
After Claire Dupont and Florian Trauner introduce 
the project, Richard Lewis sets the historical and 
cultural context and explains how the UK and the 
EU have come to such a low-point in their relations. 
Next, five policy fields are analysed: justice and 
home affairs; free movement policies; EU external 
representation; the (digital) single market; and 
environmental policy.
What is the state of the EU policy? 
‘The European Single Market […] has transformed the way Europeans live, work, 
travel, do business and study. It has opened up opportunities for businesses to 
expand successfully on the global market’  (European Commission 2012).
Pioneered by the Delors Commission in the 1980s and launched on 1 January 
1993, the European Single Market, also known as the EU’s Internal Market, 
is an open market where barriers have been abolished to guarantee the ‘four 
freedoms’ among member states: free movement of goods, capital, services and 
people. The Single Market aims at promoting specialisation, economies of scale 
and efficient allocation of resources so as to raise the aggregate welfare in the 
European economy. Increased competition will lead to better quality European 
products and services at lower prices, which will also increase EU’s global 
competitiveness. The Single Market is one of the EU’s greatest achievements, 
also for global trade and investment.
Key macroeconomic achievements attributed to the Single Market 
(European Commission 2012)
• Increase of 2.13% or €233 billion in EU27 GDP in 2008, or an average of 
€500 extra in income per person in the EU27 in 2008.
• Creation of 2.77 million new jobs, or a 1.3% in total EU employment, 
over the period 1992-2012.
• Increase in intra-EU trade in goods from €800 billion in 1992 to €2,800 
billion in 2011, or from 12% of EU GDP in 1992 to 22% in 2011.
• Increase in flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) between EU countries 
from €64 billion in 1992 to €260 billion in 2010 (before the economic 
downturn, €730 billion).
The Juncker Commission is spearheading internal market developments in the 
contemporary global information era with its Digital Single Market (DSM) 
initiative (European Commission 2015). This is the follow up to the European 
Commission’s eEurope (1999) and i2010 (2005) strategies, which have all 
focused on slimming down regulation in the fast-paced field of technology 
development and adoption. The Digital Single Market seeks to reduce the 
burdens of economic operators by shifting towards a digitally driven economy, 
where regulatory differences between EU member states are harmonised and 
cross-border trading simplified. The DSM is the European response to the global 
challenges of ensuring economic growth in an age when digital technologies 
are eroding state and market boundaries. The European Commission (2016) 
estimates that the completion of the DSM could ‘contribute €415 billion per 
year to our economy and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs’.
The European Commission’s DSM strategy identifies three main pillars: access 
to digital goods and services, regulation of networks, and industrial growth. 
Concretely, the DSM has already delivered some achievements for European 
citizens in terms of access to services: the success most touted by the European 
Commission is the reduction of mobile roaming costs for European travellers. 
Industrial growth has been supported by research and development funds, 
currently disbursed through (among others) the Horizon 2020 programme.1  In 
the near future, EU regulations will also help provide a (more) secure online 
environment for all Europeans (notably regarding data protection).
What is the UK’s role/interest in the (Digital) Single Market? 
‘Our participation in the Single Market, and our ability to help set its rules is the 
principal reason for our membership of the EU’  (David Cameron 2013).
The European Single Market has evolved in a continual tussle between market-
based and state-centric approaches to harmonisation. Those advocating a market-
based approach to the Single Market merely seek to create a level-playing field 
in which market players can compete on fair terms. The key term is liberalisation 
rather than regulation. Others adopt a more interventionist approach, viewing 
state involvement as necessary and desirable to strengthen the European economy 
and its players. Generally speaking, the UK prefers to leave the developments 
to the markets to the extent possible, and use as light a policy approach as 
possible where that is not sufficient (Geddes 2013; Oliver 2015). In the Council 
of Ministers, a coalition of liberal Northern states often builds around the British 
position, facing not only the Mediterranean member states, but on issues such 
as mutual recognition of degrees and certificates also increasingly Germany.
The UK’s vision of encouraging a market-led approach to harmonisation is also 
illustrated in its position on the DSM. The UK strongly supports the removal of 
internal barriers and believes that, with 500 million European consumers across 
28 member states, the DSM provides the key to place the EU on the top in 
the global (knowledge and innovation) economy, making it more productive, 
better for small businesses, and fit for the digital age (UK Government 2015). 
The debate focuses on the means of achieving the objectives. It is again 
not only the Southern EU countries, but the ordo-liberal German approach 
that distrusts the markets that the British approach tries to harness. British 
interest is thus in ensuring that market principles are applied equally in the 
online and offline worlds. Recent examples include policy debates on network 
neutrality, data protection, modernisation of copyright and development 
of standards in the Internet of Things (European Commission 2016).
A related, yet distinct area of high interest to the UK is the European support for 
innovation and modernisation of research infrastructures. British involvement in 
the EU’s ICT-related research programmes is intense and very fruitful. Year on year, 
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the UK is one of the largest recipients of EU research grants in absolute terms, 
and has supported technological development in both research and commercial 
fields (Simmonds et al. 2010). Approximately €3.3 billion will be made available 
in 2016 and 2017 for ICT-related research in the Horizon 2020 programme.
What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario?
‘If the British cannot support the trend towards more integration in Europe, we 
can nevertheless remain friends, but on a different basis. I could imagine a form 
such as a European economic area or a free-trade agreement’ (Delors 2012).
The discussion surrounding the UK’s departure is loaded with opinions, 
assumptions and misunderstandings. Proponents of a ‘Brexit’ believe that the 
benefits to the UK economy of the European Single Market are vastly overstated 
and the UK’s dependence on the Single Market is simply a myth. Those led by 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron emphasise the importance and benefits of 
being in the EU, while pushing for reforms on how the EU develops as a trading 
partner. Both camps wish to see economic cooperation with the EU continue 
in some form. One possible shape this could take is a Norway-style agreement 
(despite political insistence from Cameron that this will not happen), where the 
UK retains access to the Single Market. However, joining the European Economic 
Area would mean that the UK would have no ability to directly influence EU 
policies, and in effect would be subject to ‘regulation without representation’. 
Norway is also a net contributor to the EU, but has traditionally chosen this 
model due to its ability to avoid being part of the Common Fisheries Policy.2
Importantly, a separation from the EU would mean that in the institutional 
politics of the EU, the European Commission as a proponent of a liberal agenda 
on the Digital Single Market would lose its greatest ally, while the UK could 
only influence the debate from the side lines.3  It is not unlikely that EU-wide 
liberalisation efforts in the DSM would stall, shifting the regulatory balance 
towards a more interventionist approach to harmonisation.4  We illustrate the 
potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ with three Digital Single Market policies. 
First, the UK has a strong interest in the copyright reform and enforcement 
debate in the EU. As the discussions at a European level have been at a standstill 
for quite some time, the UK has taken policy action at a domestic level. For 
instance, the UK’s co-regulatory ‘follow-the-money’ approach to online 
copyright infringement through the involvement of financial and advertising 
intermediaries is regarded as best practice in the EU. Consequences of a 
‘Brexit’ would therefore not necessarily be felt immediately.5  However, the UK 
would lose its say in determining the future direction of a policy field that is 
high on the European Commission’s agenda and crucial to online commerce.
Second, concerning access to goods and services, the UK (along with the 
European Commission) has been a strong promoter of removing mobile 
roaming charges, but might see its previous efforts turn to vain if it 
leaves the EU. Indeed, the UK could continue to benefit from the recently 
approved roaming regulation only if it adopts Norwegian-style cooperation 
or forms some other sort of treaty arrangement with the EU, none of which 
is certain, should the ‘withdrawal Article’ 50 TEU be invoked. Otherwise 
the fate of British customers in Europe would depend on individual 
agreements between operators, far less clear-cut than the present model.
Third, the most practical example is that the UK would need to continue to 
contribute to the EU’s research and innovation programmes to ensure access 
to EU bids for UK research institutions and companies. It is clear that the 
EU is not afraid of using research funding as leverage. When Swiss voters 
decided to limit the number of workers coming from the EU due to rising 
immigration concerns, the EU responded by blocking Swiss universities 
from EU research projects and the Erasmus exchange programme. Israel, 
another country that participates in EU R&D programmes, was forced to 
exclude research organisations based in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
from participation in Horizon 2020, in a last-minute concession that had 
threatened to see Israel removed from the programme altogether (Abbott 2013).
In sum then, there is agreement that, in terms of the Digital Single Market, 
mutual benefits occur for the UK and the EU when the UK is part of the EU. For 
the most part the European Commission also shares the market-based approach 
pushed by the UK in shaping regulation tailored to the digital environment. 
Although much is undetermined at this time, we argue that a ‘Brexit’ will entail 
several losses for both parties, even after a period of uncertainty. For the UK, 
(further) barriers to UK businesses’ and consumers’ access to transactions of 
goods and services would emerge across the EU, while for the EU itself, the 
loss of the UK’s input on the Digital Single Market would doubtless lead to 
more debate on how market-driven the Digital Single Market policies should be.
Endnotes
1.  This paper will not delve into contestations around the effectiveness of EU-level 
research funding, commonly referred to as the ‘European paradox’: ‘a strong EU public 
sector science base coupled to a relatively weak R&D performance of EU firms’ (Tijssen and 
van Wijk 1999).
2.  For a detailed overview of seven alternative models of economic cooperation with the 
EU, please consult Piris, J.-C. (2016). If the UK Votes to Leave. Seven Alternatives to EU 
Membership. London: Centre for European Reform. Retrieved on March 2nd, 2016 from 
https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/pb_piris_brexit_12jan16.pdf.
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3.  In this context, see for instance the statement of a British civil servant within the 
then Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) that ‘in areas that are core to the DTI, trade 
policy and Single Market policy, we are closer to the Commission probably than any other 
member state’ (quoted in Buller and Smith 1998: 174).
4.  Tim Oliver (2015: 421-422) concurs that ‘[i]n the longer term a Brexit could make the 
EU less inclined towards liberal, free market economics’. At the same time he argues that 
the UK’s liberal regulatory influence is already limited by its exclusion from the Eurozone 
and questions the extent to which the European Commission, Germany or even France 
would permit a more protectionist agenda.
5. Although regulatory issues between national and European licensing and enforcement 
agencies may arise.
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What is the state of EU environmental policy?
Environmental policy is an area of shared competence in the EU. Over time, with the 
growth in EU environmental legislation, more competence in internal policy measures 
has been moved to the EU level, while external representation in international 
environmental organisations and negotiations remains shared between the EU 
and member states. As many environmental problems are ‘collective’ or ‘commons’ 
problems, policy responses necessarily need the buy-in from a multitude of actors, 
often across borders in a regional or global context, to be effective (Hardin 1968).
EU environmental policy has become ever more ambitious since its beginnings in the 
1970s, at least until the mid-2000s (Haigh 2015). It moved member states towards 
adopting a precautionary approach to environmental protection, and promoted 
principles such as environmental policy integration across policy sectors for the 
pursuit of sustainable development (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Art. 11). 
The EU has also tried to upload these principles to the international level by means 
of its participation in many multilateral environmental agreements. Results of more 
than forty years of EU environmental policy have shown marked improvements in 
the quality of the environment and reductions in pollution (EEA 2016). Key early 
environmental policy measures that still form a strong base in EU policy include 
the Birds and Habitats Directives (adopted in 1979 and 1992 respectively). In the 
UK, the implementation of these Directives led to the establishment of 620 ‘Special 
Protected Areas’, 31 ‘Sites of Community Importance’ and 270 ‘Special Areas of 
Conservation’, including both land and marine protected sites.1  EU environmental 
policy only expanded and grew over the years, with measures on water quality and 
management, chemicals management, noise pollution, environmental assessment, 
air pollution, waste management, marine protection, biodiversity protection and 
climate change being added to the portfolio. Overall, policy measures increased in 
number and, usually also, in ambition.
The continued high ambition of EU environmental policy was stalled somewhat in 
the wake of the 2008 economic and financial crises. Member states with pressing 
unemployment, debt, and competitiveness concerns became less interested and less 
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pressured to move forward on innovative and far-reaching environmental policy 
measures (Dupont & Oberthür 2016). Nevertheless, the EU as a whole remains a 
leading actor in many environmental policy areas, and has been striving to be 
an international leader on climate change, in particular, since the early 1990s 
(Groen 2015). This international stance has helped keep climate change on the 
agenda. It resulted in active EU diplomacy in the run up to the Paris climate 
change negotiations in December 2015. These negotiations culminated in the 
Paris Agreement, which can be considered a success. The Agreement includes calls 
for higher ambition to keep global temperature increase well below 2°C, or even 
1.5°C, compared to pre-industrial levels. The success of the Paris negotiations is 
partly thanks to the EU’s diplomatic efforts, and can also be considered a win for 
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investigating the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ 
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the EU’s leadership role on climate change (Oberthür and Groen forthcoming).
Despite these improvements, much remains to be done across the environmental 
field (notably in air, water and soil quality, in transitioning away from fossil fuels 
in a timely enough fashion, and in the protection of ecosystems) to protect and 
improve the quality of the environment (EEA 2016). The underlying philosophy of 
EU environmental policy has changed over time, with narratives justifying action 
based on balances between ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ gradually displacing the lauded 
precautionary approach (Gollier & Treich 2003). This has led to a situation where 
environmental policymakers need to demonstrate multiple (economic) benefits 
to justify taking action.
Finally, the growth of the EU’s environmental policy has often been a centre-
point for the development of policy in other sectors (such as energy), leading 
to ever more environmental policy measures. It is a prime example of how 
policy sectors are intertwined. Environmental policy objectives also need to be 
taken into account in the development of policies in other sectors (for example 
through green budgeting, which uses environmental criteria to allocate a budget 
in a certain policy area) (Jordan & Lenschow 2010). As such, EU environmental 
policy has sometimes provided a hook for spillover developments in closely 
interconnected policy fields (Haigh 2015). EU climate policy, for example, has 
become ‘climate and energy’ policy (Oberthür & Pallemaerts 2010; Jordan et al. 
2010). Considering the challenges of climate change and energy supply, such 
interconnections make sense, but also result in increased perceptions of ‘Brussels’ 
driving policy in member states, although EU policy is anyway negotiated among 
member states themselves.
What is the UK’s role in EU environmental policy?
When the UK entered the EU in the early 1970s, environmental policy was largely 
untouched at EU level, and national governments were in charge of the field. 
The UK was developing policies in response to its own environmental problems 
(like air pollution issues as demonstrated by the ‘Great Smog’ of 1952). However, 
environmental issues are complex interconnections of human activity across 
borders. Transboundary cooperation – at the EU and international levels – grew 
in the following decades, with international agreements on acid rain (the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution), ozone layer protection 
(the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 
Montreal Protocol) and on climate change (the 1992 UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol), for example, to which the UK 
(and the EU) are parties (Burns et al. 2016). 
EU policy developments often responded to the international agenda on 
environmental policy governance by implementing specific measures to tackle 
an issue. Increasingly (since the 1990s), however, the EU has helped to set the 
agenda at international level and has also developed original policy frameworks 
that set unofficial standards or that have been taken up in other jurisdictions 
(such as the REACH legislation on chemicals) (Biedenkopf 2012). Thus, the EU has 
increasingly aimed to ‘lead by example’ in international environmental policy, 
by both agreeing to stringent commitments internationally and developing 
ambitious policy measures internally to meet or surpass these commitments 
(Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008).
From being ambivalent towards environmental action in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the UK was dubbed the ‘dirty man of Europe’, the UK moved to becoming 
an environmental actor within the EU. It adapted its own environmental 
governance structures in response to EU developments and also increasingly 
shaped the form and stringency of EU environmental policy (Burns et al. 2016). 
It pushed for environmental policies that were aligned with the UK’s vision 
of a free market economy. The UK became a leader within the EU on climate 
change and was instrumental in driving the development of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions trading within the EU in response to climate change (leading to 
the adoption of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme). The UK today is part of the 
pro-climate action ‘Green Growth Group’ of member states and is generally a 
leading member state on environmental action. The UK pushed for agreement on 
a target to reduce GHG emissions in the EU by 20 per cent by 2020 in 2007 and 
for agreement on a target to reduce emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 (Jordan 
et al. 2010; Dupont & Oberthür 2015). It has also done well out of a number 
of EU policies on the environment, for example on marine issues. As a state 
with a large coastline and significant marine resources, the UK benefits from 
the EU’s marine strategy framework Directive, the maritime spatial planning 
Directive and other instruments that outline a common legal framework for the 
sustainable development of maritime industries, such as offshore wind energy 
and the fishing and aquaculture industries.
More recently, the UK has also been a driving force behind the EU’s turn towards 
better regulation (REFIT – regulatory fitness), which, from the perspective of 
environmental policy, often means ‘less policy’. The understanding of ‘better 
regulation’ stemmed from the review of the Lisbon Strategy to 2020 (in 2005) 
and focused on regulatory impacts on jobs and growth, while ignoring the 
importance of sustainable development for achieving such goals. Much of 
the EU’s environmental policy has come under question under this push, with 
established policy measures under threat of being reopened for negotiation and 
watered down, and proposed measures being weakened or withdrawn (Wilkinson 
et al. 2005; Radaelli 2007; Taylor et al. 2012). At international level, the UK has 
acquired a prominent role in shaping EU external environmental and climate 
policy and diplomacy. Building on its strong diplomatic network across the 
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world and its wealth of diplomatic experience and expertise, it has been able to 
shape European environmental diplomacy in the EU’s ‘Green Diplomacy Network’ 
and beyond, while also benefitting from the capacities of other member states 
(e.g. special external relations of France, Spain and others). In doing so, it has 
contributed to, and benefitted from, enhanced EU influence through the pooling 
of resources by EU member states, including in climate geopolitics (Oberthür 
2016). A major source of the EU’s international influence has been ambitious 
internal policy and thus ‘leadership by example’ based on the EU’s ‘market’ 
and ‘regulatory power’ (Damro 2015). Overall, coordination of international 
environmental policy and diplomacy within the EU has been a win-win for the 
UK and the EU.
What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario?
In the case of a Brexit scenario, we can hypothesise that there would 
be implications on 1) the UK’s environmental policy standards, 2) the 
EU’s environmental policies and 3) the strength and influence of both 
the UK and the EU in developing international environmental standards.
First, the UK’s own environmental standards may be affected. Many 
environmental NGOs and experts suggest that if the UK were to leave the EU, 
its own environmental policies and standards would be compromised, especially 
over the longer term.2 Today the general contours of national environmental 
policy are agreed first in concert at the EU level. We could thus assume that 
with Brexit, as the UK will no longer be bound by these policy developments, it 
may choose to water down or abandon a number of measures that are perceived 
as too costly. However, there are alternatives to such a scenario. We could also 
envision that national policymaking procedures may allow the UK to have more 
freedom to adopt environmental policies that are ambitious, and that can be 
adopted and implemented more swiftly than at the EU level. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that where environmental protection measures are costly upfront, acting 
alone would be more difficult than acting collectively. At present, member states 
within the EU are anyway permitted to adopt more stringent measures in several 
areas of environmental policy.3 We could also envision that future UK national 
environmental policies will be more linked to the specific national and local 
environmental problems, with adaptation to negative impacts becoming ever 
more important. A last possibility is that the UK would anyway (need to) take 
on the environmental policies and standards of the EU, especially related to 
product standards or process impacts, given that trade in products with the EU 
will remain a key part of the UK’s economy whether it is in or out of the EU. 
Furthermore, effective environmental policies often require a multitude of (cross-
border) implementing actors. The UK will also be a party to various international 
environmental agreements that will to some extent limit its room for manoeuvre 
if it decides to roll back its environmental policy ambition – environmental 
agreements that anyway inspired or required some EU environmental policies.
Second, for the EU, the exit of the UK may lead to a readjustment of the 
coalitions within the Council. At present, the UK is a member of the Green 
Growth Group, which regularly supports action to protect the environment, 
and, in particular, to combat climate change. Without this influential member, 
the strength of the group is likely to decline in face of mounting influence of 
less enthusiastic member states. This thus could lead to a situation where EU 
environmental policy itself becomes less ambitious, with more discretion given 
to member states to implement overarching environmental ‘objectives’ as they 
see fit. Competing priorities may pull attention away from environmental issues. 
An example of how new internal (less ambitious) coalitions may impact the 
strength and success of EU environmental policy can be seen in the proposed 
framework for climate and energy policies to 2030 (European Council 2014). In 
this case, member states have agreed to one EU-level binding target for reducing 
GHG emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, combined with 
an EU-wide renewable energy share target of at least 27 per cent (no longer 
including binding targets for each member state as was the case in 2009), 
and a non-binding commitment of at least 27 per cent improvement in energy 
efficiency by 2030. Given that the EU has already achieved about 24 per cent 
GHG emission reductions in 2014 (EEA 2015), and is also set to achieve more than 
20 per cent share of renewable energy by 2020, the suggested targets do not 
demonstrate the level of ambition that one could expect from an international 
leader on climate change. Without the UK pushing for ambitious measures, 
the EU may struggle even to achieve the targets already agreed in 2014.
Third, the UK and the EU would both likely see a decline in their influence 
in global environmental governance. This decline could stem from their 
relative reduced weight, but the risk of weaker policies in both the EU and 
UK would also hamper leadership, which often emanates from the ability 
to demonstrate successful domestic policy measures. Overall, the EU and 
UK may also lose out on the opportunities presented by the transition to 
a low-carbon economy, including technological development, the opening 
of new markets and heightened research expertise in a growing economic 
sector. The EU allows for ease of research cooperation across borders and 
the single market boosts opportunities for trade in innovative products.
These hypotheses are not the only options that can been visaged under a Brexit 
scenario. Environmental policy ambition may increase as environmental and 
climate crises become more acute, but it is more likely that the increase in 
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ambition both within the EU and the UK would be lower and slower than if the 
UK remains an active  EU member, where  it can  push for  and be pushed by 
sufficient collective action.    
Endnotes 
1. http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-23 and http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-1399, accessed 29 
February 2016.
2. http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/page_2040.php, accessed 26 February 2016.
3. Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU: ‘The protective measures 
adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with 
the Treaties. They shall be notified to the Commission.’
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